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Building on sociological research on institutions and
organizations and psychological research on risk and
decision making, we propose that the development of
institutions that reduce the risks of entering new sectors
has a stronger effect on the founding rates of firms using
novel technologies than on firms using established tech-
nologies. In an analysis of the independent-power sector
of the electricity industry from 1980 to 1992, we found
that the development of regulative and cognitive institu-
tions legitimated the entire sector and provided incen-
tives for all sector entrants; thus, foundings of all kinds of
firms multiplied rapidly but had a stronger impact on
those using risky novel technologies. In contrast, the cen-
tral normative institutions that developed in this sector,
state-level trade associations, provided greater support
for particular forms (those using established technolo-
gies) and thus increased foundings of those favored
forms more than foundings of less favored forms (those
using novel technologies). Our study demonstrates how
institutional forces can alter the mix of organizations
entering a new industry and thus contribute to diversity,
as well as similarity, among organizations.•
Entrepreneurship is inherently risky. The U.S. Small Business
Administration showed that 71 percent of new ventures
failed within four years and 85 percent failed within five years
(U.S. Small Business Administration, 1983). A more recent
study, which included only employing firms, estimated failure
rates to be 34 percent, 50 percent, and 60 percent after two,
four, and six years, respectively (Headd, 2001). Two factors
exacerbate the risks associated with entrepreneurship: enter-
ing a new industry (or an emerging sector in an old industry)
and using a new technology. As Aldrich and Fiol (1994)
argued, the difficulties that all new ventures face are magni-
fied in new industries and sectors by lack of familiarity and
skepticism about the industry’s viability on the part of
resource providers and the general public. Founding firms
that use new production or distribution technologies are
especially risky because many of those needed to launch any
new venture—employees, financial backers, suppliers, cus-
tomers, and the general public—are unfamiliar with new
technologies and thus are likely to be skeptical of or even
hostile toward them.
Many scholars have noted the paucity of research on new
kinds of organizations in emerging areas of activity (Aldrich
and Fiol, 1994; Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Scott, 2001).
Although we know that changes in the institutional environ-
ment can provide legitimacy for new organizational forms,
we don’t have a theory of how the development of cognitive,
regulative, and normative institutions affects the legitimacy of
new sectors or how this, in turn, affects the founding rates
of organizations with forms that are considered to be higher
risk. In general, we lack a theory that explains how institu-
tional development affects the overall heterogeneity of firms
entering new industries. Our focus in developing such a theo-
ry is on the conditions that encourage entrepreneurs to take
risks on founding firms using novel, unproven technologies in
new industries and the conditions that inhibit such risk tak-
ing, in particular, the economic, political, and cultural barriers
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to entry, and the institutions that raise or lower those entry
barriers. We test this theory in a study of firms entering the
new independent-power sector of the U.S. electricity industry
in the 1980s and 1990s.
Starting in 1935 and for over 40 years thereafter, the U.S.
electricity industry was heavily regulated, and regional
monopolies held by established utilities precluded entrepre-
neurial activity. But in 1978, reacting to rising electricity
costs, Congress passed a law requiring utilities to purchase
and distribute power from independent power plants. Pas-
sage of this law created opportunities for these kinds of pro-
ducers that had been foreclosed during the previous four
decades, in effect, opening a new sector. Thousands of orga-
nizations using diverse technologies emerged to fill the inde-
pendent-power sector (Russo, 2001). Our description of the
independent-power sector below illustrates the challenges
that await entrepreneurs who seek to enter new sectors,
especially those who use new technologies, and grounds our
development of hypotheses about the kinds of organizations
and entrepreneurs that entered this sector. The theory we
develop builds on psychological research on decision making
under risk and institutional and ecological models of organiza-
tions.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE INDEPEPENDENT-POWER
SECTOR
In the early 1970s, electric utilities were regional monopolies,
the sole suppliers of electric power within their regions. They
provided electric service on demand, and the prices private
utilities charged for electricity equaled generating costs plus
a reasonable profit. Utilities both generated and distributed
power. Thus, utilities were regional monopsonies: non-utility
generators could not sell directly to consumers, and utilities
had no incentive to give non-utility generators access to their
distribution networks. With the exception of large hydroelec-
tric plants, utilities relied almost exclusively on production
technologies that burned fossil fuels. Although innovators
explored alternative electricity-generating technologies, utili-
ties’ monopsonistic position allowed them to lock would-be
innovators out of the market for electric power (Hirsh, 1999:
81–83). Prior to the late 1970s, virtually no independent
power plant sold wholesale power to utilities using either
conventional non-renewable or novel renewable (see the
Appendix) energy sources (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983).
In October 1973, the situation began to change dramatically.
An embargo by the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries
caused major oil shortages (U.S. Department of Energy,
2001); these shortages were exacerbated by the Iranian Rev-
olution of 1978. Between 1973 and 1979, oil and gas prices
quadrupled. Utilities tried to reduce their reliance on oil and
gas by converting to solid-fuel plants, but the costs of con-
version and of solid fuel were high and were exacerbated by
high interest rates; hence, electricity prices remained high.
This dramatic shift in energy economics provided a splendid
opportunity for outsiders to promote new agendas (Sine and
David, 2003). Environmental activists, who had been increas-
ingly vocal since the publication in 1962 of Rachel Carson’s
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alarm call, Silent Spring, joined forces with those who pro-
posed to conserve energy through industrial cogeneration,
involving the capture and use of excess energy (heat or
steam) from existing industrial processes, and with advo-
cates of various renewable energy-producing technologies.
Activists and technologists banded together to found several
grass-roots organizations, such as the American Wind Energy
Association in 1974 and the Solar Lobby in 1978, which
shaped public opinion by promoting environmentally friendly
strategies for generating power. Some activists explicitly
eschewed “brown” (non-renewable fossil and nuclear) fuels
and advocated the use of only “green” (renewable) energy
sources. Others encouraged more efficient use of brown
fuels. Though the use of cogeneration technology and renew-
able energy sources to generate power for resale was
extremely rare in the United States before 1980, it was com-
mon elsewhere (e.g., geothermal plants in Iceland, New
Zealand , and the Soviet Union). New legislation sponsored
by the Carter administration, however, changed all this.
In 1978, Congress passed the National Energy Act, which
included the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).
PURPA’s goal was to decrease reliance on imported oil by
making it easier for entrepreneurs to found two types of
independent power generators, cogenerators and small
power plants (Fox-Penner, 1990; Russo, 2001). Cogeneration
encompasses both plants using non-renewable fuels (coal,
oil, natural gas, and nuclear fuel) and those using renewable
energy sources (biomass, wind, geothermal, solar, hydro
power). Small power plants were defined under PURPA as
generators using biomass, waste, or renewable resources as
a primary energy source and generating less than 70
megawatts per year. Our study only includes those cogenera-
tion facilities that applied for qualifying status under PURPA
in order to sell electricity to utilities.
PURPA allowed independent power producers (“qualifying
facilities”) to depreciate capital investments over five years
instead of the usual fifteen, to burn natural gas in turbines,
and to be exempted from some gas price increases and from
expensive existing utility regulation policies. Finally, PURPA
required utilities to buy or exchange power with qualifying
facilities at utilities’ avoided generation costs—the costs they
avoided by not generating the power themselves. Although
PURPA’s intention was clear, the potency of its impact was
largely unforeseen (Hirsh, 1999). As John B. Wing, general
manager of General Electric’s new cogeneration department
declared, “PURPA created a whole new market, and a whole
new opportunity for us” (Diamond, 1984: 2).`
Green versus Brown Technologies
The Appendix describes the major green and brown tech-
nologies used in the independent-power sector, organized by
fuel source. The aim of PURPA was to encourage a variety of
electric-power technologies, and all the technologies used by
facilities founded after PURPA were to some degree uncon-
ventional. But there were critical differences between tech-
nologies that used “brown” or non-renewable fuels and
those that used “green” or renewable energy sources. Most
202/ASQ, June 2005
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qualifying facilities using green power sources were small
power plants, and those using brown power were typically
cogenerators. At the time of PURPA’s passage, with the
exception of large hydroelectric plants, little power was gen-
erated in the U.S. using renewable sources: in 1978, of the
2,206 billion kilowatt-hours of power generated by utilities,
87 percent came from coal, petroleum, natural gas, or
nuclear plants; 13 percent came from large-scale hydro
plants; and less than 0.001 percent came from other renew-
able sources (U.S. Department of Energy, 2001).
Because they were virtually unused in the U.S., green tech-
nologies were viewed with more skepticism than brown
technologies, and entrepreneurs promoting green technolo-
gies found it especially difficult to gain the support of key
constituents, starting with investors. As one developer of
wind power interviewed for this study remarked, “New tech-
nology is unnerving to the financial community.”1 Our inter-
views indicate that venture capitalists and private investors
demanded high rates of return from organizations using new
technologies, which they described as “new” and “untest-
ed” and thus risky. In line with this, Wiser and Kahn (1996)
found that the cost of capital for wind-power plants averaged
20 percent higher than for traditional coal or natural-gas-burn-
ing plants. Reminiscing about a geothermal pioneer who
claimed he could solve the energy crisis by pumping hot,
salt-laden, subterranean water to the surface and using this
heat to generate electricity, one investor recalled, “I remem-
ber thinking, ‘Do I want to put money into this guy?’ A lot of
people thought he was not playing with a full deck of cards.”
Many communities were similarly doubtful about technolo-
gies that tapped green energy sources. An early geothermal-
power entrepreneur remarked, “Locals were very skeptical
about drilling on or under their land. They had never heard of
underground aquifers nor, for that matter, geothermal
power.” One early biogas-plant founder commented:
It took four years to get the permits to build. Many people and local
government officials had misconceptions about what the plant was
doing. Some thought it was dangerous because it dealt with
methane; others were worried it would explode; others thought it
would be too noisy or vibrate. We had to bus a number of people to
the plant and give them tours. People were simply afraid of new
technology.
Ironically, the proposed biogas technology was much less of
a threat to the surrounding population, in terms of noise and
potential accidents, than the existing landfill. Because the
biogas plant actively captured escaping methane and so
reduced the chance of an explosion, it made the waste facili-
ty safer, not more dangerous. And the biogas plant made lit-
tle noise, far less than garbage trucks entering and leaving
the landfill.
Equipment suppliers were also more skeptical about unfamil-
iar green technologies than more familiar brown-fuel sys-
tems. Berger (1997: 27) reported a solar-power pioneer as
recalling, “No establishment company would have anything
to do with you. They considered solar to be off the wall.”
The inability to form partnerships with suppliers meant,
1
This quotation and others below come
from interviews with entrepreneurs, ven-
ture capitalists, and other industry partici-
pants. More information on these inter-
views is in the Method section below.
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among other things, that entrepreneurs could not secure
lines of credit, which strained their meager cash flows. Final-
ly, key personnel were hard to find. As one wind-power exec-
utive said, “In the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was difficult
to recruit employees. No one took non-utility power compa-
nies seriously. We lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the pub-
lic.”
The widespread lack of support for green power, relative to
brown power, had a big impact on the choices of entrepre-
neurs. One financier described his decision to invest in
brown-fuel cogeneration systems this way: “Green power is
just not economically feasible.” Another said, “The technolo-
gy was not there. There really was no great alternative [to
brown fuels]. Wind is ugly, geothermal is limited, and solar is
not cost-effective.” Entrepreneurs who sought to tap green
energy sources also reported tremendous technical uncer-
tainty. An engineer in a geothermal plant said, “We did not
fully understand what we were getting into. Early on nothing
worked.” Given the difficulties that entrepreneurs attempting
to found firms using green technologies faced, one might
wonder why any entrepreneur would choose to found a firm
using anything except an off-the-shelf, established technolo-
gy, but many did.
Entrepreneurs’ Choices and Types of Independent Power
Firms Founded
Variations in entrepreneurs’ choices of technology in founding
new electric-power plants reflected several influences. First,
in general, entrepreneurs’ goals are heterogeneous. Some
are motivated by money, others by technical or aesthetic
challenges, and still others by a desire to improve society.
Such heterogeneity was clearly evident among independent-
power entrepreneurs. For example, cogeneration pioneer
Michael Dingman, the chief executive officer of Wheelabra-
tor-Frye, sought substantial returns on his investment, while
Roger Sant and Dennis Bakke, the founders of Applied Ener-
gy Systems, were initially motivated by social concerns
(Berger, 1997). Heterogeneous motivations are not peculiar
to the electric-power industry. Among California winery own-
ers, for example, only 22 percent of those surveyed were
motivated by money, while 78 percent were motivated by
“love,” meaning pride in what they produced (Scott-Morton
and Podolny, 2002).
Second, different entrepreneurs have access to different sets
of resources, which also affects their technology choices.
Education, prior work experience, and social networks affect
access to knowledge, capital, and suppliers, as well as the
ability to recruit technically proficient workers. Entrepreneurs’
experience also affects their cognitive skills; specifically, it
shapes their ability to recognize that new technologies can
be used to build new kinds of organizations (Shane, 2000). In
support of this argument, Boeker’s (1988) analysis of the
semiconductor industry showed that people with back-
grounds in research and development founded first-mover
firms using cutting-edge technologies, those from manufac-
turing founded low-cost firms using highly reliable mass-pro-
duction technologies, and those from marketing and sales
204/ASQ, June 2005
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founded niche firms using flexible production technologies. A
similar level of heterogeneity in terms of background and
knowledge is apparent among independent power entrepre-
neurs. For example, wind-power pioneer Henry Clews was
an aerodynamic engineer who had become a farmer (Righter,
1996: 161–171), while geothermal entrepreneur B. C.
McCabe had strong ties to the oil industry and learned from
oil exploration crews about hot subterranean lakes in the Cali-
fornia desert (Berger, 1997; interview with Bill Cole and Paul
Nakamoto, 1999).
Third, production technologies vary greatly in their level of
development, which influences both entrepreneurs’ choices
and their ability to obtain external support. The level of tech-
nological development reflects two issues. Most basically,
there is technical feasibility: Will something that works in
small-scale laboratory demonstrations work in the field? Even
after technical feasibility has been demonstrated, the issue of
economic feasibility remains: Will something that works in
the field be cheap and reliable enough to compete with
established technologies? Because the costs and benefits of
newer technologies are harder to assess than those of older,
better-developed technologies, newer technologies are usual-
ly perceived as riskier bases for new ventures. This was
apparent in independent power after PURPA was passed.
Solar power was about ten times as expensive as traditional
utility power in 1978 (Mead and Denning, 1991). While some
experts were hopeful about its promise, others argued that it
would never be economically viable (Velocci, 1980). Some
entrepreneurs interviewed for this study predicted large
increases in the efficiency of wind turbines, while others pre-
dicted that wind power would never be economically feasi-
ble. There was great uncertainty about the potential of bio-
mass as a fuel source because the required infrastructure—
systems for collecting, transporting, and processing bio-
mass—simply did not exist (Hahn, 1980; Engalichev and
Mathur, 1981). Likewise, geothermal power was viewed as
an expensive and unproven technology, albeit one that held a
great deal of promise (Berger, 1997). And although cogenera-
tor technologies that burned oil and natural gas were fairly
well developed, they were by no means mature. Thus,
although brown technologies were generally better devel-
oped than green technologies, no technology appeared to be
a clear winner.
Given variation in entrepreneurs’ goals and background and
variation in technological development, two choices made by
potential entrepreneurs—whether to found a firm and what
kind of firm to found—are difficult to separate logically or
empirically. Some entrepreneurs first choose to launch and
then choose what kind (the standard economic model), while
others first choose what to launch and then choose whether
and when to launch. In the independent-power sector, entre-
preneurs who advocated the use of green fuels were most
likely to follow the second path. Green entrepreneurs gener-
ally started by becoming interested in a particular technology
and followed through only when prices paid by utilities, com-
bined with tax credits, were high enough to support their
technology of choice (Righter, 1996; Hirsh, 1999). Conse-
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quently, the willingness and the ability of entrepreneurs with
differing preferences and resources to achieve their goals
were affected by the development of institutions in the
industry.
Institutional Influences on Foundings in New Sectors
As sectorwide institutions develop, they influence entrepre-
neurial activity by altering the costs, benefits, and risks asso-
ciated with such activity, thus determining the likelihood that
entrepreneurs will act on their diverse technology prefer-
ences. In this way, institutions determine the kinds of tech-
nologies that are eventually implemented in new ventures.
Our ideas, laid out below, are based on general institutional
and ecological arguments and on psychological research on
decision making; we use evidence gleaned from interviews
and industry histories to show that our arguments are ger-
mane to the independent-power sector.2
In analyzing how institutional forces affect the kinds of firms
that are founded in new sectors, the well-established tri-
chotomy of regulative, cognitive, and normative forces (Scott,
2001: 51–58) is useful in distinguishing between different
institutional effects. In new sectors, regulative institutions—
the laws and administrative guidelines that constitute the
basic rules governing market transactions and so provide
sociopolitical legitimacy for organized action—are usually
undeveloped, limited in scope, or subject to contestation
(Weiss, 1988; Lindberg and Campbell, 1991). Cognitive insti-
tutions—shared perceptions of the boundaries and viability of
new kinds of social activity—are also largely absent from
new sectors (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). And normative
institutions—”expert” sources of information about the
nature of new sectors, values (what is important and good),
and norms (how things should be done)—take time to devel-
op (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Because new sectors typi-
cally lack institutional support, the chances of success for all
entrants are initially low; thus, few potential entrepreneurs
are able to surmount entry barriers and actually found new
ventures (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). The devel-
opment of regulative, cognitive, and normative institutions
legitimates new sectors and makes resources easier to
acquire; in turn, these changes reduce perceived risks and
increase entry rates.
Entrepreneurs who seek to enter new sectors using novel,
rather than established technologies must shoulder a double
burden: they incur both sectorwide and technology-specific
risks. These combined risks strongly limit entrepreneurs’ will-
ingness and ability to act, in part because they limit other
people’s willingness to supply key resources to new ven-
tures. When institutions reduce sectorwide risk, either direct-
ly by providing incentives or indirectly by increasing the sec-
tor’s legitimacy, they have less impact on entrepreneurs who
seek to use established technologies than on those who
seek to use new technologies because, for the former, the
probability of acting is already relatively high; in other words,
a ceiling effect operates (Thaler et al., 1997).
This ceiling effect occurs because people are risk averse:
their estimates of the value derived from any action increase,
2
We do not apply the resource-partitioning
model because it does not explain what
kinds of organizations enter new indus-
tries or new sectors of old industries.
This model assumes strong economies of
scale in production or distribution, which
is unlikely to be true of new industries or
new sectors, where technology is in flux.
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but at a decreasing rate, with the likelihood of realizing a
desired outcome from that action. Moreover, people’s per-
ceptions of outcomes are highly dependent on their initial ref-
erence point: people respond to expected changes in out-
comes—gains or losses—rather than to outcomes
themselves (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1992; Thaler et al., 1997). On top of this, the propen-
sity to take any action is more sensitive to expected gains or
losses when initial outcomes are small than when they are
large (Weber, Shafir, and Blais, 2004), because perceptions of
change in outcomes are proportional to the relative size of
the change, not the absolute size (Weber, 1978). For exam-
ple, the difference between a .10 and .15 probability of suc-
cess (an increase of .05, or 50 percent over the initial proba-
bility) looms larger than the difference between a .25 and .30
probability of success (an increase of .05, or 20 percent over
the initial probability). Such percentage framing (Thaler, 1980)
guides many economic decisions.
Extending these ideas to decisions by entrepreneurs to
launch new ventures and decisions by resource providers to
support new ventures, a decline in the overall level of risk
associated with a new sector should have a bigger impact on
the founding of firms using uncertain new technologies than
those using more-certain established technologies. Figure 1
illustrates this effect. The horizontal axis represents the prob-
ability that a new venture based on a particular technology
will be successful, while the vertical axis represents the prob-
ability that a new venture will be founded. In this graph, the
relationship between the probability of success and the prob-
ability of acting (the value associated with the probability of
207/ASQ, June 2005
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Figure 1. New venture-risk and founding probability: Ventures using new vs. established technologies.
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founding a new venture) increases at a decreasing rate. The
two vertical lines to the left show probabilities of a hypotheti-
cal new venture being founded using a risky novel technolo-
gy, while the two vertical lines to the right show probabilities
of a hypothetical new venture being founded using a less-
risky established technology. The exact locations of these
lines along the X axis do not matter. What matters is that the
lines for a venture using a new technology are to the left of
the lines for a venture using an established technology,
reflecting the former’s greater risk and lower chance of suc-
cess. For each type of venture, the vertical line on the left
shows the probability of founding when sectorwide institu-
tions are less developed and thus sectorwide risk is very
high, while the vertical line on the right shows the probability
of founding when sectorwide institutions are better devel-
oped and thus sectorwide risk is lower.
When the development of institutions decreases sectorwide
risk, the probability of success for any venture rises, regard-
less of whether it uses an established or novel technology. If
we assume, as in figure 1, that the probability of success for
any venture rises by .05, the probability of founding a firm
using a novel technology rises from .19 to .28, an increase of
.09 (47 percent), while the probability of founding a firm
using an established technology rises from .44 to .51, an
increase of .07 (16 percent). Thus the development of institu-
tions that reduce sectorwide risk increases founding rates for
all types of firms by making both entrepreneurs and resource
providers more likely to act. But institutional development
increases absolute founding rates more for firms using risky
novel technologies than for firms using less-risky established
technologies. Given the relative rarity of foundings of firms
using novel technologies, these changes are much larger, in
percentage terms, for firms using novel technologies than for
firms using established technologies. These changes in
founding probabilities, in turn, have the aggregate effect of
increasing founding variety: foundings include a lot more of
what had been relatively rare types of enterprise (those built
around new technologies) and a little more of what had been
relatively common types of enterprise (those built around
established technologies).
The development of particular kinds of regulative, cognitive,
and normative institutions will affect the risks entrepreneurs
face and thus alter founding rates for different kinds of firms
and change the mix of firms founded.
Regulative effects on foundings. Changes in government
regulations can raise or lower sectorwide economic entry
barriers by altering financial incentives for all players in the
affected sector: making organizations subject to or exempt
from costs associated with regulatory oversight; creating or
eliminating price supports; and providing or eliminating tax
relief, loans, or subsidies. When regulations lower economic
entry barriers for an entire sector by increasing state financial
support, foundings in the sector increase (Hannan and Free-
man, 1977; Wholey and Sanchez, 1991). Increased state sup-
port for a new sector has the biggest impact on organizations
that use new technologies, ones that face especially high lev-
els of risk. Consequently, foundings of these formerly rare
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kinds of organizations should increase at a relatively high
rate, which yields greater founding heterogeneity. Our inter-
views with advocates of green technologies accord with this
general logic. PURPA was perceived by these advocates as
creating opportunities to found electricity generators only
when prices paid by utilities, combined with tax credits, were
high enough to support their technology of choice. This con-
clusion is reiterated in interviews of small power-plant opera-
tors reported by Righter (1996) and Hirsh (1999). Thus, we
hypothesize:
H1a: Increases in state financial support for the new independent-
power sector will have a larger positive effect on the founding rate
of firms using novel technologies than those using established tech-
nologies.
H1b: The greater the state financial support for the new indepen-
dent-power sector, the greater the technological heterogeneity of
foundings in that sector.
In addition to altering economic entry barriers, regulatory
changes may affect political entry barriers (Aldrich and Fiol,
1994; Suchman, 1995; Strang and Sine, 2001). Laws that cre-
ate a new sector are often challenged by organizations
whose positions are threatened by the new sector. Although
court verdicts upholding such laws do not necessarily end
legal challenges to a new sector, by setting precedent they
increase regulative legitimacy and reduce legal uncertainty. In
short, favorable court rulings are interpreted as endorse-
ments of a new sector and thus lower the risks of entering
that sector. Again, because decreasing risk is especially
important for organizations using higher-risk novel technolo-
gies, the effects of such rulings on the founding rates of
organizations using novel technologies will be greater than on
the founding rates of organizations using established tech-
nologies. As one entrepreneur we interviewed put it, “The
greater the legal uncertainty, the more lawyers we hire, and
the less chances we take.” This differential effect on found-
ing rates, in turn, generates increases in founding diversity.
Uncertainty over the legal status of PURPA was an important
obstacle to entrepreneurs considering entering the indepen-
dent-power sector. Early court battles between qualifying
facilities and utilities created uncertainty and increased the
difficulty of obtaining important resources, especially financ-
ing (Betts, 1983). On May 16, 1983, the Supreme Court
upheld PURPA’s mandatory-interconnection and avoided-cost
provisions. Although this verdict did not keep some utilities
from contesting the law on other grounds, it did provide a
strong endorsement of the sector. In the words of several
analysts, the Supreme Court decision removed the “legal
clouds casting a shadow over the development of small
power plants and cogeneration” (Nowak, 1983: 12) and was
“the strongest possible endorsement for FERC’s [the Federal
Regulatory Commission’s] avoided costs and interconnection
rules” (Betts, 1983: 1). We therefore hypothesize:
H2a: Court rulings that uphold laws favoring the new independent-
power sector will have a larger positive effect on the founding rate 
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of firms using novel technologies than those using established tech-
nologies.
H2b: Court rulings that uphold laws favoring the new independent-
power sector will increase the technological heterogeneity of found-
ings in that sector.
Cognitive effects on foundings. Cultural entry barriers are
especially high in new sectors (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Zucker,
Darby, and Brewer, 1998) because little is known about the
determinants or even the probabilities of success, making
both investors and entrepreneurs wary; hence, overall found-
ing rates are low. The emergence of shared definitions of a
sector as economically viable is shaped in part by the number
(density) of organizations operating in it. Increases in the sec-
tor’s density enhance its cognitive legitimacy, partly through
diffusion processes: the more actors in a sector, the more
knowledge of the sector is likely to spread, the more likely
the public is to accept it as a viable sphere of economic activ-
ity, and the more likely potential entrepreneurs are to believe
they could succeed (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Hannan and
Carroll, 1992). Moreover, increasing density fosters the devel-
opment of social infrastructures that smooth the path for
future entrepreneurs, such as standard operating procedures
and contracts and specialized training programs for workers.
Increasing density thus reduces sectorwide risk and
enhances entrepreneurs’ ability and willingness to launch
new firms, especially those using higher-risk new technolo-
gies. Based on the logic above, increasing density will also
lead to increases in founding heterogeneity.3
H3a: Increases in the density of organizations in the new indepen-
dent-power sector will have a larger positive effect on the founding
rate of firms using novel technologies than those using established
technologies.
H3b: As the density of organizations in the new independent-power
sector increases, the technological heterogeneity of foundings in
that sector will increase.
Our interviews reveal that potential independent power
entrepreneurs were initially very pessimistic that utilities
would honor contracts with qualifying facilities; instead, many
thought utilities would dip into their deep pockets to fight
protracted court battles. As more qualifying facilities contract-
ed with utilities, generated electricity, and sold electricity to
utilities, their very existence eased the concerns of all poten-
tial entrepreneurs, those who preferred green and brown
technologies alike.
The press also plays an important role in building a sector’s
cognitive legitimacy by disseminating information about a
sector and by endorsing its practices, in short, by facilitating
the sharing of experience and knowledge (Gamson et al.,
1992; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Media are “a site on which
various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle
over the definition and construction of social reality” (Gure-
vich and Levy, 1985: 19). Media discourse reflects as well as
creates public opinion about particular sectors (Gamson and
Modigliani, 1989); thus, media mentions also indicate the
extent to which a sector is considered legitimate. Positive
3
The effect of sector density on founding
rates could be monotonic (positive) or
non-monotonic (inverted-U-shaped),
depending on whether sector density
approaches the carrying capacity. As any
new sector matures and the carrying
capacity of its resource base is reached,
further increases in density will trigger
competition strong enough to overwhelm
the beneficial legitimating effects (Hannan
and Freeman, 1989; Hannan and Carroll,
1992). When that happens, foundings of
organizations using risky novel technolo-
gies and founding variation should both
decline. Because we studied the indepen-
dent sector in its early stages—the first
thirteen years of its history—we did not
expect competitive effects, which would
generate the inverted U. Nonetheless, in
the analyses presented below, we investi-
gated this possibility.
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media attention to a sector both increases its status as a
credible site for business and reflects the development of
knowledge about the sector. Even neutral accounts—mere
recordings of a sector’s existence—can increase its accep-
tance by increasing public perception of it as a standard cul-
tural category. Like increasing density, then, increasing media
attention is associated with a reduction of the perceived risks
of entry into a sector and an increase in foundings. Again, we
expect the impact to be greater among firms using higher-
risk new technologies than among firms using lower-risk
established technologies, and therefore founding diversity
will also increase.
In the independent-power sector, the initial lack of sector
legitimacy was a significant obstacle for founders. Early on,
entrepreneurs and potential investors were skeptical of the
sector, particularly when utilities refused to interconnect with
and purchase electricity from qualifying facilities (Righter,
1996; Hirsh, 1999). As the press documented successful out-
comes of qualifying facilities’ efforts to interconnect with util-
ities, entrepreneurs and investors gained assurance that the
rules governing the new sector would be adhered to and that
independent power generators could succeed. We therefore
expect media coverage to have an effect on foundings and
the heterogeneity of firms founded:
H4a: Increases in media coverage (neutral and positive accounts) of
the new independent-power sector will have a larger positive effect
on the founding rate of firms using novel technologies than those
using established technologies.
H4b: As media coverage (neutral and positive accounts) of the new
independent-power sector increases, the technological heterogene-
ity of foundings in that sector will increase.
Normative effects on foundings. Collective actors, such as
professional and trade associations, are major sources of nor-
mative institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such collec-
tive actors are generally absent from new sectors, but over
time, recognition of common interests—securing passage of
supportive state regulation, sharing information about com-
mon problems, and promoting the sector to investors and the
general public—often leads sector participants to band
together formally (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Romanelli, 1989).
Organizations representing collective interests can contribute
to the legitimacy of a new sector in several ways (David,
Sine, and Haveman, 2005). First, they often help foster the
creation of regulative institutions (e.g., favorable tax policies)
that reduce economic and political entry barriers and lower
sectorwide risk. Second, by serving as a source of public
information, collective actors contribute to the spread of
knowledge about the sector; thus they contribute to the
development of sectorwide cognitive institutions as well,
which lower cultural entry barriers and sectorwide risk.
In addition to increasing the legitimacy of the sector as a
whole, these kinds of collective actors may differentially
affect the legitimacy of different forms of organization. By
selecting particular conference speakers, emphasizing certain
topics in association publications, and disseminating informa-
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tion in other ways, such organizations often, intentionally or
unintentionally, promote particular practices and forms of
organization as “best,” thereby creating form-specific norma-
tive support. By providing normative support for some kinds
of organization, such as those that use particular production
technologies, collective actors decrease investors’ and entre-
preneurs’ perceptions of the risks associated with founding
the favored kind of organization. By the same token, the lack
of support for other kinds of organizations may increase their
perceived risks. Because active participation in collective
organizations is often costly, in terms of personal time and
money, such organizations are often dominated by elites—
wealthier, relatively conservative members (Selznick, 1949;
Lipset, 1950; Heinz and Laumann, 1982). Consequently, col-
lective organizations’ policies and sanctioned practices often
reflect the interests of these risk-avoiding elites and so tend
to favor less-risky established technologies over riskier new
technologies.
In New York and California, the most powerful collective rep-
resentatives in the independent-power sector were two trade
associations, the Independent Energy Producers Association
of California (IEPA, founded May 15, 1982) and the Indepen-
dent Power Producers of New York (IPPNY, founded June 17,
1986). The IEPA lobbied the state government on such
issues as interconnection with utilities, tax credits, the formu-
la used to define avoided costs, and the creation of standard
contracts. The IPPNY also promoted legislative changes that
benefited its members. Both associations collected, codified,
and distributed information about the independent-power
sector. For example, the IEPA held annual conferences at
which experienced entrepreneurs and technologists were
invited to discuss the costs and benefits of particular power-
generating technologies. At these conferences, entrepre-
neurs met and shared stories with owners and managers of
other generating facilities and thus learned what really
worked—so-called “best practices.” The IPPNY collected
data on qualifying facility location, size, technology, and plant
efficiency. These data were summarized in reports and dis-
tributed to association members; entrepreneurs often con-
sulted these reports before establishing new generating
plants. Finally, both organizations promoted the industry to
the media by issuing numerous press releases. In these
ways, state-level trade associations distilled, codified, and dif-
fused norms across the independent-power sector and so
influenced entrepreneurs’ technology choices.
Although created to represent the general interests of firms
in the new sector, the IEPA and IPPNY were, like many other
collective organizations, dominated by a particular segment of
the membership, one identified with more established tech-
nologies. The IEPA was originally founded to lobby California
legislators on behalf of cogenerators. Although the IEPA
recruited all types of independent power plants and sought to
represent the entire sector, active involvement in IEPA gover-
nance required substantial resources, which representatives
of firms using cogeneration technologies could contribute
more easily than representatives of other types of organiza-
tions. Thus, in 1987, over half of the members on the IEPA’s
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board of directors were from firms using cogeneration tech-
nology. Several people interviewed for this study suggested
that a subtle emphasis on cogeneration pervaded the organi-
zation and its activities. Because over 99 percent of cogener-
ators used brown fuels (mostly natural gas or coal), the
emphasis in these associations on cogeneration also meant
an emphasis on less-risky fossil-fuel technologies.
The sectorwide effects of these collective institutions is to
increase foundings using novel technologies more than
foundings using established technologies and therefore to
increase founding heterogeneity. These effects are largely
indirect, however, operating through the associations’ effects
on regulative institutions (e.g., increased state support for a
sector) and cognitive institutions (e.g., increased media cov-
erage of a sector). In contrast, the form-specific effects of
collective institutions, which narrow the spectrum of organi-
zations founded by favoring certain types of organizations
over others, operate directly. Therefore, we propose that
after the effects of mediating regulative and cognitive institu-
tions have been taken into consideration, only the narrowing
direct effects of normative institutions on new independent
power firms will be observed:
H5a: The establishment of trade associations in the new indepen-
dent-power sector will have a smaller positive effect on the found-
ing rate of firms using novel technologies than those using estab-
lished technologies.
H5b: The establishment of trade associations in the new indepen-
dent-power sector will decrease the technological heterogeneity of
foundings in that sector.
METHOD
Sample
We studied independent power producers founded between
1980 and 1992, inclusive. These start and end dates conform
to important events in the history of the electric power indus-
try. Although PURPA was passed in 1978, the first qualifying-
facility filings were not submitted until 1980. The passage of
the Energy Policy Act in October 1992, which allowed non-
utility generators to circumvent the restrictions of the Public
Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), changed the
regulatory environment dramatically once again. This law cre-
ated a new category of electricity producers, exempt whole-
sale generators (e.g., Enron). Some exempt wholesale gener-
ators did not meet qualifying-facility guidelines, while others
did, making qualifying facilities founded in 1993 and onward
very different than those founded before.
We limited our analysis to two large states, New York and
California, because high-quality data are available from each.
Most other states (e.g., Idaho, Washington, and Utah) kept
incomplete records, while a few states (e.g., Arizona) did not
dictate any specific formula for calculating avoided costs,
leaving it up to the utilities and qualifying facilities to negoti-
ate. This often resulted in a complex bargaining process in
which utilities had the upper hand (Arenchild, 1996; Russo,
2001). Because our data are derived from only two states, it
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may be appropriate to view the analysis as a comparative
case study. But because these two states were leading sites
for independent power, our sample of 2,067 qualifying facili-
ties represents almost half of the facilities founded in the
U.S. during our 13-year observation period. Of these, 2,027
involved new generators, 33 involved generators that existed
prior to PURPA but had not sold power to utilities, and 7
involved both existing and new components. Limiting our
analysis to new generators did not change our results;
accordingly, the results we show below include data on both
new and existing generators.
Data Sources
The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
required all owners, operators, or developers of electricity-
generating plants that sought recognition as qualifying facili-
ties to file basic facts about their plants. If a proposed facility
met PURPA’s ownership and technical requirements, it was
accorded the status of a qualifying facility. FERC published a
database of all filings (U.S. FERC, 1993) from which we
derived the core data for our analysis: applicant name,
address, filing and certification dates, generator type (new,
existing, or both), facility type (cogenerator or small power
plant), and energy source (biomass/biogas, geothermal,
hydro, solar, wind, fuel oil, natural gas, coal, waste natural
gas, nuclear, other waste, or “other,” which includes
anthracite culm, blast furnace gas, coke oven gas, digester
gas, and petroleum coke).
We supplemented the archival data with 52 interviews of
qualifying-facility founders, managers, and technical employ-
ees conducted by the first author. We randomly selected two
facilities founded in New York and two founded in California
each year from 1980 to 1992 and interviewed representa-
tives from these facilities. In addition, the first author inter-
viewed 20 other industry participants and observers, includ-
ing venture capitalists, energy consultants, state regulatory
board members, trade association representatives, and FERC
and Department of Energy employees. These interview data
grounded our thinking about this sector; in particular, they
guided our choice of measures and strengthened our under-
standing of hypothesized structural relationships.
Dependent Variables
We examined two outcomes: (1) founding rates of firms
using novel (green) and established (brown) technologies
between 1980 and 1992, inclusive, and (2) heterogeneity
among firms founded between 1980 and 1992, inclusive.
Both dependent variables rest on a classification of organiza-
tional forms derived from categories used by government
and private-sector analysts. This classification reflects two
key dimensions of production technology: fuel (biogas, natur-
al gas, hydro, etc.) and facility type (cogenerator or small
power plant). Table 1 lists the organizational forms in order of
founding frequency and notes their average sizes.
These technology-based organizational-form categories cap-
ture important differences. First, a MANOVA analysis
revealed that within-form variation on size is significantly less
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than between-form variation (F = 9.64; d.f. = 2,066; p <
.001), indicating that the scale of operations is strongly relat-
ed to the technological form. Second, technological choices
influence alliance patterns. For example, cogeneration plants
using natural gas require the cooperation of industrial facili-
ties, while wind farms often rely on alliances with farmers
and ranchers. Third, plants that tap into different fuels have
very different production processes; for example, biogas
plants siphon and burn methane from garbage dumps and
sewage facilities, geothermal plants drill deep wells and
transfer heat from scalding subterranean lakes, and wind
farms capture winds to move giant blades that spin turbines
(for details, see the Appendix). Figure 2 charts foundings of
the four most common forms over time. Although natural gas
cogenerators dominated after 1985, many firms with other
forms were also founded.
Founding rates of firms using established vs. novel technolo-
gies. We captured the distinction between novel and estab-
lished technologies by classifying facilities into those that
used green fuels and those that used brown fuels. Because
brown technologies were better-understood technically, had
lower development costs, and were more culturally estab-
lished than green technologies, they were generally less risky
bases for new ventures than green technologies. Following
the U.S. Department of Energy and industry analysts, we cat-
egorized these fuel types as green: biomass/biogas, geother-
mal, small hydro, solar, and wind. We categorized the remain-
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Table 1
Forms of Independent Power Producers in California and New York,
1980–1992
X Frequency
X (percent of the Average size
Generator form* population) (kilowatt)
Natural gas cogenerator 39.37 9,904
Hydro small power plant 16.25 3,584
Wind small power plant 12.97 2,624
Biogas/biomass small power plant 11.72 8,471
Coal cogenerator 4.56 39,194
Other waste small power plant 3.67 7,594
Biogas/biomass cogenerator 3.18 14,553
Geothermal small power plant 2.01 16,971
Fuel oil cogenerator 1.48 7,390
Other waste cogenerator 1.25 23,301
Solar small power plant 1.01 5,803
Other cogenerator 0.88 15,250
Other small power plant 0.78 1,663
Waste natural gas small power plant 0.45 2,255
Natural gas small power plant 0.18 615
Solar cogenerator 0.08 213
Nuclear cogenerator 0.04 9,762
Waste natural gas cogenerator 0.04 707
Fuel oil small power plant 0.02 25
Geothermal cogenerator 0.02 5,000
Hydro cogenerator 0.02 180
Wind cogenerator 0.02 4,000
* The category “other waste” includes liquid acetonitrile waste, tall oil, waste
alcohol, medical waste, paper pellets, sludge waste, solid byproducts, tires,
agricultural byproducts, closed loop biomass, fish oil, and straw. The category
“other” includes batteries, chemicals, hydrogen, pitch, sulfur, and purchased
steam.
ing fuel types as brown: fuel oil, natural gas, coal, waste nat-
ural gas, nuclear, other waste, and “other.” There were
cogenerators and small power producers in both categories,
although most cogenerators used brown fuels and most
small power producers used green fuels.
Heterogeneity of foundings. After classifying new qualifying
facilities using the categories listed in table 1, we calculated
the heterogeneity of foundings in California and New York
every six months between January 1, 1980, and December
31, 1992, as follows:
heterogeneityt = 1
n
Σ
i=1
Pit
2,
where Pit is the proportion of all foundings in a focal state
during the six-month period t with form i (Blau, 1977). This
index measures the probability that randomly sampled pairs
of firms being founded in any given period will have different
forms (Lieberson, 1969). The minimum value of this index,
which occurs when all foundings in a period are of a single
form, is zero. As foundings include a larger number of forms,
the index approaches one. The maximum value equals 1 –
1/n, where n is the number of forms among the organizations
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Figure 2. Technology diversity among newly founded independent power producers.
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founded in the focal six-month period. We aggregated data
on founding heterogeneity into six-month spells because we
reasoned that for a new sector, one-year intervals would not
be fine-grained enough to capture important changes. We
decided against using three-month spells because many
would see only one, two, or three kinds of qualifying facilities
founded, and so the range on the dependent variable would
be restricted.
Model Specification and Estimation
Firm founding rates. Founding can be understood as an
arrival process, wherein each newly founded independent
power plant is an addition to the unit of analysis—here, the
state. We have exact founding dates for all independent
power plants, so we could calculate the exact time between
arrivals in each state and estimate event-history models,
rather than aggregated event-count models. This approach
maximizes the use of available information. We modeled
founding as a semi-Markov process, which assumes that the
founding rate does not depend on history (i.e., the time path
of prior arrivals) but, rather, depends on characteristics of the
population and its environment and time since the last found-
ing event (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Carroll and Han-
nan, 2000).
We used the Cox proportional-hazards model introduced by
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), which is quite flexible with
respect to time dependence. We estimated this model using
the stcox procedure in the Stata statistical package (Stata,
2001), which controls for right censoring. We estimated sep-
arate models of green- and brown-technology founding
rates.4 To do so, we created one observation for every found-
ing event of the focal type, meaning green- or brown-technol-
ogy founding. The start date of each event was the day on
which the previous founding event occurred of the same
technology type; the end date was the day on which the
focal founding event occurred. We created two dependent
variables. Each was coded as one whenever the focal type of
firm (using green or brown technology) was founded, and
zero otherwise. We analyzed 2,067 foundings of two organi-
zational forms in two states over 13 years; thus on average,
39.8 foundings of each organizational form occurred in each
state each year, or one founding of each organizational form
in each state every 9.2 days.
Our data contained many “tied” observations, meaning many
days that saw two or more foundings, but ties did not cluster
by day of week, week, day of month, or month. To deal with
tied observations, we estimated all models using the exact-
marginal calculation, which calculates the conditional proba-
bility of the tied events. This method is more accurate and
more reliable than other methods (Kalbfleisch and Prentice,
1980; DeLong, Guirguis, and So, 1994). We used a Stata utili-
ty, the link test, to verify adequate parameterization of our
models (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002). We used the
Wald test to determine whether the difference between the
pair of coefficients on each independent variable (green- vs.
brown-technology founding rate) was statistically significant
(Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez, 2002). Finally, we reestimated
4
We could also have estimated these two
founding rates together, using a compet-
ing-risks model. Both approaches, esti-
mating the two founding rates together
and estimating them separately, yield
identical results (Cox and Oakes, 1984:
142–146; Allison, 1995: 186–188).
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all models using the robust option in Stata, which generates
robust standard errors based on the Huber-White estimator;
we also estimated all models using the cluster option for
state. These results did not differ materially from the baseline
results, so we do not present them here.
Heterogeneity of foundings. Because founding heterogene-
ity is a continuous variable, we analyzed it using linear regres-
sion methods. Our data set for this analysis consists of 52
observations: 26 six-month periods for each of the two
states. Because we observed each state multiple times, our
observations were not independent. Consequently, we faced
three possible forms of bias: serial autocorrelation, cross-sec-
tional autocorrelation, and heteroskedasticity. To deal with
these biases, we used a feasible generalized least-squares
estimator, the xtgls command in Stata (2001). We also con-
ducted a tobit analysis, because the dependent variable is
truncated (its range runs from zero to almost one). The tobit
analysis generated results similar to linear regression.
Because the linear regression results are easier to interpret,
we report them below.
Explanatory Variables
Regulative effects. We employed three variables to index
regulatory institutions. The first, avoided costs, taps the
effects of regulations concerning the price utilities paid inde-
pendent generators for power. PURPA defined avoided costs
rather loosely as the costs utilities would incur for generating
the same amount of electricity as they purchased from a
qualifying facility. Interpretation and enforcement of avoided
costs was left to individual states. In California, regulators
generally calculated avoided costs for each utility as a func-
tion of fuel prices and construction costs for new plants; the
precise formula for avoided costs depended on each utility’s
past investments and fuel mix. California also offered long-
term contracts that specified avoided costs at particular rates
over a certain number of years. In New York, in contrast, reg-
ulators set avoided costs at the same level for all utilities in
the state. We gathered data on avoided costs from the Cali-
fornia Public Utility Commission and the New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority. For each state,
we calculated the average avoided costs paid by utilities dur-
ing each six-month period. We lagged this variable six
months to allow time for entrepreneurs to react to changes
in this institutional support; that is, we measured avoided
costs six months before the start of each observation on
foundings (for analyses of green- vs. brown-technology
foundings), or six months before the start of each six-month
period (for analyses of founding heterogeneity).
A second measure, tax credit, gauges the impact of tax relief
to independent power generators. From 1978 to 1985, the
federal government offered a 10-percent investment tax
credit for all qualifying facilities. The variable we created to
assess the impact of this tax credit on foundings was coded
one when the sectorwide tax credit was offered, and zero
otherwise. A third measure, Supreme Court decision, assess-
es the Supreme Court decision of May 16, 1983, which
upheld PURPA’s mandatory-interconnection and avoided-cost
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provisions. This variable was set to one after the Supreme
Court decision and zero before. Again, we lagged these mea-
sures of regulative institutions six months.
Cognitive effects. We captured cognitive institutional effects
with two measures: the density of independent power pro-
ducers and the total number of positive and neutral articles
about this sector in major U.S. newspapers and magazines.
Unfortunately, we could not procure a central registry of qual-
ifying facilities, so we had to find other sources for these
data. All power sold on the wholesale market by independent
power producers was purchased by traditional utilities, who
kept records of all firms with which they had contracts and
the start and end date of each contract. We gathered these
data from each utility in California and from the New York
Public Service Commission. We then created a database of
all facilities that sold power to traditional utilities and mea-
sured sector density as the number of facilities that had con-
tracts with utilities in a focal state. We also created a squared
term for sector density to capture possible competitive
effects of density.
We assessed media coverage by counting the number of
positive and neutral articles on the independent-power sector
reported in three major newspapers (the Wall Street Journal,
New York Times, and Washington Post) and three business-
oriented journals (the Economist, Business Week, and
Newsweek). These outlets have national readership, cover
national business trends, and have electronic archives.5 We
searched on-line databases for each source using several key
words: independent power, qualifying facility, QF, PURPA,
cogeneration, cogenerator, solar, wind, biomass, biogas, and
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act. Positive articles focused
on the positive attributes of the sector and spent relatively lit-
tle time reviewing its weaknesses, while neutral articles
pointed to both the pros and cons of the energy policy or
simply reported on events within the sector. Purely negative
articles were rare (43 out of 2,739 articles), so we excluded
them from our analysis. We lagged this variable six months.
Normative effects. The most powerful sources of normative
influence in this sector were the two trade associations men-
tioned above, the Independent Energy Producers Association
of California (IEPA, founded May 15, 1982) and the Indepen-
dent Power Producers of New York (IPPNY, founded June 17,
1986). Interviews with association founders and employees
revealed that once an association was founded, it took
approximately a year to gather information, arrange confer-
ences, and distribute information to association members
and the media. Thus we created dummy variables set equal
to one a year after association founding and zero before that
date.
Control Variables
Because we pooled data from two states, our analyses
included a binary indicator variable (CA = 0, NY = 1) to control
for state-level differences not captured by the independent or
control variables. Human population and the economy affect
entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the viability of new enterpris-
es, so we controlled for state population (in millions), gross
5
Forbes and the Los Angeles Times have
no electronic archives for the period 1978
to 1985; therefore, they were not includ-
ed in our sample of news media.
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state product (in hundreds of millions of 1996 dollars), and
the prime interest rate. The price of natural gas affected pro-
duction costs, so we controlled for this factor (in 1996 dollars
per thousand cubic feet). Sector age signals durability and
reliability to potential entrepreneurs and resource providers,
so we included as a control the number of months since the
passage of PURPA. In analyses of founding heterogeneity,
we also controlled for the number of foundings in the focal
state in a given period because periods when few firms were
founded tended to have low heterogeneity.
In addition to the tax credits that supported the entire sector,
which is one of our independent variables, there were also
tax credits that promoted green energy specifically. From
1980 to 1985, the federal government offered a 15-percent
credit for investment in renewable energy (Klepper, 1978;
Glanternik and Lipton, 1979; Wells, 1986). In 1985, this tax
credit was reduced to 10 percent (U.S. Department of Ener-
gy, 1996, 2001). In addition, from 1980 to 1992, California
offered tax credits for qualifying facilities that used renew-
able technologies (Fox-Penner, 1990; Arenchild, 1996; per-
sonal communication, California Public Utilities Commission,
2000). We measured green tax credits separately from the
sectorwide tax credits. For each state in each year, we added
the applicable federal and state tax credits together into a
single measure and divided it by 10, so its scale would match
that of the sectorwide tax credit. For example, in 1980, Cali-
fornia offered a 25-percent tax credit for qualifying facilities
using any green technology, and the federal government
offered 15 percent; thus the measure of green tax credits in
1980 equalled 4.0 and 2.5 for California and New York,
respectively.
RESULTS
Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c report descriptive statistics for variables
used in the analyses of founding rates and founding hetero-
geneity, respectively. Several variables in our analysis are
highly correlated. Such multicollinearity makes regression
coefficients unstable and inflates standard errors. Several
authors have suggested dealing with multicollinearity by
orthogonalizing highly correlated variables using a modified
Gram-Schmidt procedure (Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Saville
and Wood, 1991). This technique partials out the common
variance, creating transformed variables that are uncorrelated
with one another. We used the orthog command in Stata to
generate orthogonalized measures. We then tested for multi-
collinearity and found that all variance-inflation factors were
substantially less than 30, and most were less than 2, indicat-
ing an acceptable level of multicollinearity.
Founding Rates of Organizations Using Green vs. Brown
Technology
Table 3 shows Cox proportional-hazard models of the found-
ing rates of firms using green and brown technologies. For
each kind of venture, model 1 is a baseline model containing
only control variables, while model 2 is a fully specified
model containing all variables.
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Regulative effects. All three regulative variables had positive
effects on the founding rates of green- and brown-technology
firms. The effects on the green-technology founding rate
were always larger than the effects on the brown-technology
founding rate, and the differences between all three pairs of
coefficients were statistically significant. Holding all other
variables at their means, when avoided costs increased by
$.01/kilowatt-hour, the founding rates of firms using green
and brown technologies rose by 27.3 percent and 10.7 per-
cent, respectively. On average, the sectorwide tax credit
increased green-technology foundings by 18.3 percent, but it
had a non-significant effect on brown-technology foundings.
Taken together, these two results support hypothesis 1a. Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court ruling, the founding rates of
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Table 2b
Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis of the Founding Rates of Green-Technology Independent Power Pro-
ducers*
Variable Mean S.D. .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .10 .11 .12 .13 .14
01. State (CA = 1) .76 .43
02. State population/106 24.50 3.92 .96
03. Gross state product/108 .51 .11 .52 .73
04. Prime interest rate/10 1.40 2.22 .17 –.01 –.46
05. Natural gas price 2.98 .57 .33 .15 –.37 .45
06. Sector age/10 73.3 29.5 –.24 .01 .68 –.70 –.67
07. Green tax credit/10 3.41 1.13 .88 .77 .25 .20 .57 –.40
08. Avoided costs/10 5.26 1.31 –.19 –.37 –.59 .20 .50 –.38 .12
09. Sector tax credit .49 .50 .31 .11 –.42 .66 .73 –.72 .30 .36
10. Supreme Court decision .40 .29 .21 .13 –.13 –.03 .57 –.30 .32 .32 .43
11. Green density/100 2.16 1.54 .52 .73 .97 –.45 –.39 .61 .26 –.69 –.47 –.17
12. Green density2/100 704 885 .38 .61 .91 –.34 –.49 .61 .07 –.76 –.49 –.30 .95
13. Brown density/100 4.57 3.35 .71 .85 .85 –.37 –.10 .32 .55 –.52 –.26 .08 .89 .75
14. Media coverage/100 .67 .41 .13 .03 –.22 .12 .48 –.35 .27 .21 .19 .33 –.21 –.25 –.11
15. Trade association dummy .82 .38 .18 .31 .59 –.58 –.26 .56 .11 –.15 –.36 .34 .51 .35 .54 –.14
* These statistics cover 2,067 observations on foundings of independent power producers in California and New York
between 1980 and 1992. The univariate statistics reflect the untransformed variables. For all correlations greater than
.06, p < .05.
Table 2a
Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis of the Founding Rates of Brown-Technology Independent Power Pro-
ducers*
Variable Mean S.D. .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .10 .11 .12 .13 .14
01. State (CA = 1) 0.77 .42
02. State population/106 25.2 4.13 .96
03. Gross state product/108 0.57 .12 .57 .77
04. Prime interest rate/10 9.53 1.97 .02 –.12 –.41
05. Natural gas price 2.63 .53 .07 –.12 –.54 .57
06. Sector age/10 8.81 2.91 –.23 .02 .64 –.53 –.69
07. Green tax credit/10 3.19 1.02 .82 .67 .15 .15 .46 –.52
08. Avoided costs/10 4.55 1.43 –.53 –.71 –.84 .46 .62 –.43 –.04
09. Sector tax credit 0.20 .40 .09 –.10 –.51 .70 .76 –.69 .22 .47
10. Supreme Court decision 0.29 .24 .11 –.03 –.39 .15 .66 –.58 .36 .34 .54
11. Brown density/100 5.65 3.74 .80 .89 .80 –.42 –.36 .19 .51 –.82 –.42 –.11
12. Brown density2/100 4778 3514 .72 .83 .80 –.46 –.47 .25 .38 –.87 –.50 –.21 .98
13. Green density/100 3.02 1.7 .63 .81 .97 –.41 –.54 .53 .21 –.89 –.53 –.36 .89 .90
14. Media coverage/100 0.60 .39 .11 –.02 –.34 .14 .59 –.51 .28 .19 .41 .59 –.12 –.18 –.31
15. Trade association dummy 0.68 .47 .77 .85 .76 –.37 –.25 .17 .55 –.68 –.36 –.07 .95 .90 .81 –.13
* These statistics cover 2,067 observations on foundings of independent power producers in California and New York
between 1980 and 1992. The univariate statistics reflect the untransformed variables. For all correlations greater than
.06, p < . 05.
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Table 2c
Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis of Founding Heterogeneity among Independent Power Producers*
Variable Mean S.D. .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15
01. Heterogeneity .51 .22
02. State (CA = 1) .50 .50 .13
03. State population/106 22.5 4.98 .08 .95
04. Gross state product/108 49.4 17 .08 .57 .78
05. Prime interest rate/10 11 3.44 –.32 .00 –.19 –.62
06. Natural gas price 2.69 .54 .44 .00 –.13 –.43 .32
07. No. of foundings/100 .04 .05 .14 .47 .43 .26 –.29 .14
08. Sector age/10 93 45.4 .11 .00 .24 .79 –.80 –.51 .03
09. Avoided costs/10 .45 .21 .74 –.16 –.23 –.07 –.33 .33 .13 .20
10. Sector tax credit .42 .50 .02 .00 –.21 –.69 .75 .68 –.18 –.86 –.10
11. Green tax credit/10 4.32 7.07 .31 .51 .27 –.20 .31 .45 .42 –.48 .27 .39
12. Supreme Court decision .04 .19 .23 .00 –.04 –.13 –.01 .29 –.02 –.15 .12 .23 .09
13. Sector density/100 5.22 5.16 –.09 .60 .80 .92 –.52 –.46 .32 .62 –.30 –.62 –.24 –.13
14. Sector density2/100 533 802 –.14 .59 .79 .87 –.40 –.42 .22 .53 –.37 –.53 –.27 –.12 .97
15. Media coverage/100 .10 0.37 –.23 .00 –.14 –.46 .74 .13 –.41 –.56 –.31 .60 .23 –.05 –.42 –.32
16. Trade association dummy .56 0.5 .00 .35 .50 .78 –.59 –.38 .40 .76 .05 –.65 –.14 –.02 .68 .56 –.49
* These statistics cover 26 six-month spells for California and New York each. The univariate statistics reflect the
untransformed variables. For all correlations greater than .28, p < .05.
Table 3
Event-History Analysis of the Founding Rates of Brown- and Green-Technology Independent Power Produc-
ers (N = 2,067)*
Significant
Brown Brown Green Green difference
model model model model between brown and
Variable B1 B2 G1 G2 green coefficients?
State –.053•• –.063•• .028 .002
(.025) (.029) (.029) (.034)
State population/106 –.135••• –.208••• .147••• .174•••
(.026) (.029) (.027) (.034)
Gross state product/108 –.033 –.046 –.109••• –.090•••
(.028) (.029) (.029) (.034)
Prime interest rate/10 –.098••• –.081••• –.017 –.023
(.023) (.028) (.027) (.033)
Natural gas price –.076••• –.109••• –.100••• –.049
(.029) (.030) (.032) (.036)
Sector age/10 –.210••• –.359••• –.01 –.028
(.026) (.030) (.029) (.034)
Green tax credit/10 .085••• .045 .087••• .153•••
(.029) (.029) (.031) (.034)
Avoided costs/10 .102••• .241••• Yes
(.030) (.037)
Sector tax credit –.041 .169•• Yes
(.030) (.036)
Supreme Court decision .235••• .334••• Yes
(.030) (.036)
Density of focal form/100 .251••• .220••• No
(0.030) (0.040)
Density of focal form2/100 .013 .106••• Yes
(.029) (.036)
Density of other form/100 .105••• .434•• Yes
(.030) (.037)
Media coverage/100 .046• .234••• Yes
(.025) (.034)
Trade association dummy .638••• .195••• Yes
(.035) (.036)
2 96.25 595.37 55.27 385.88
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01; two-tailed test.
* Standard errors are in parentheses below parameter estimates. All independent variables have been orthogonalized.
green- and brown-technology firms increased by 39.6 percent
and 26.5 percent, respectively, which supports hypothesis
2a.
Cognitive effects. Our first measure of cognitive institutions
is sector density. To analyze founding rates of green- vs.
brown-technology firms, we distinguished between focal-
form and other-form density.6 For brown-technology found-
ings, focal-form density had a linear effect: the coefficients
on the linear and squared terms were both positive, but only
the coefficient on the linear term was statistically significant.
For green-technology foundings, focal-form density had an
exponentially increasing effect: the coefficients on both the
linear and squared terms were positive and statistically signif-
icant. Thus, for both green- and brown-technology foundings,
we see only legitimating effects of focal-form density, not
competitive effects. This seems reasonable, given the sec-
tor’s youth. On average, focal-form density increased the
founding rates of firms using green and brown technologies
by 36.4 percent and 28.5 percent, respectively. The differ-
ence between these effects was statistically significant. In
addition, other-form density had positive effects on both
kinds of foundings. The effect of other-form density on the
green-technology foundings was larger than the effect of
other-form density on brown-technology foundings, and the
difference between the coefficients was statistically signifi-
cant. Together, these results support hypothesis 3a.
Our second measure of cognitive institutions, media cover-
age, also had positive effects on both founding rates. The
effect on brown-technology foundings was only marginally
significant (p < .06), while the effect on green-technology
foundings was significant. The coefficient on green-technolo-
gy foundings was larger than the coefficient on brown-tech-
nology foundings, and the difference between the coeffi-
cients was statistically significant. On average, media
coverage of the sector increased green- and brown-technolo-
gy founding rates by 26.4 percent and 4.7 percent, respec-
tively. This pattern of results supports hypothesis 4a.
Normative effects. Finally, the presence of trade associa-
tions significantly increased both green- and brown-technolo-
gy foundings, but in line with hypothesis 5a, the creation of
these associations had a stronger impact on the brown- than
on the green-technology foundings. After trade associations
were founded, the founding rate of firms using brown tech-
nologies increased by 89 percent, while the founding rate of
firms using green technologies increased by only 22 percent.
The difference between coefficients was statistically signifi-
cant.
Founding Heterogeneity
Table 4 reports results for the analysis of overall founding
heterogeneity. Model 1 is a baseline model that includes all
controls. Models 2 and 3 add independent variables; model 3
includes the squared term for density, to explore possible
non-monotonic effects. Given the small number of observa-
tions, the parameter estimates show reasonable stability.
6
We also estimated the effects of overall
sector density and found results similar to
those discussed here, specifically,
stronger positive effects on green-tech-
nology foundings than on brown-technolo-
gy foundings.
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Regulative effects. Founding heterogeneity increased as
avoided costs rose, as predicted by hypothesis 1b. When
avoided costs increased $.01/kilowatt-hour, founding hetero-
geneity rose by 18 percent. Having a sectorwide tax credit
increased founding heterogeneity by 45 percent, further sup-
porting hypothesis 1b. The Supreme Court decision had a
positive effect on founding heterogeneity; however, this coef-
ficient was only marginally significant (p < .10). This result
provides only weak support for hypothesis 2b. Notwithstand-
ing its marginal statistical significance, the substantive signifi-
cance of the Supreme Court ruling was considerable: found-
ing heterogeneity was 22 percent higher after the Supreme
Court ruling than before.
Cognitive effects. Sector density had a positive impact on
founding heterogeneity, in line with hypothesis 3b. An
increase of 100 in the number of qualifying facilities with con-
tracts increased founding heterogeneity by 23 percent. As
shown in model 3, the squared term for density had a non-
significant effect, indicating a linear (purely legitimating)
rather than curvilinear (legitimating, then competitive) rela-
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Table 4
Generalized Least Squares Regression Analysis of Heterogeneity
among Newly Founded Independent Power Producers (N = 52)*
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept .118 –.834•• –.819••
(.180) (.354) (.356)
State† –.016 .044• .045•
(.034) (.025) (.025)
State population/106† .016 .022 .025
(.034) (.022) (.022)
Gross state product/108† –.162 –.008 –.004
(.289) (.172) (.168)
Prime interest rate/10† –.045• –.038••• –.033••
(.025) (.012) (.014)
Natural gas price† .027 .061•• .063••
(.037) (.028) (.028)
No. of foundings/100 .624 .605 .529
(.577) (.410) (.409)
Sector age/10 .084•• .173• .163•
(.041) (.095) (.095)
Green tax credit/10 –.016 –.032 –.05
(.034) (.081) (.085)
Avoided costs/10 .897••• .943•••
(.182) (.187)
Sector tax credit .227••• .230•••
(.063) (.067)
Supreme Court decision .116• .116•
(.070) (.071)
Sector density/100† .098••• .118•••
(.036) (.041)
Sector density2/100† –.018
(.020)
Media coverage/100 .129•• .140••
(.058) (.059)
Trade association dummy –.156•• –.0177•••
(.061) (.065)
2 11.79 206.12 208.28
• p < .10; •• p < .05;  ••• p < .01; two-tailed test.
* Standard errors are in parentheses below parameter estimates.
† Variable has been orthogonalized.
tionship. Media coverage, as indexed by the number of arti-
cles about the independent-power sector, also increased het-
erogeneity, which supports hypothesis 4b. Publication of 100
more articles increased founding heterogeneity by 27 per-
cent.
Normative effects. Hypothesis 5b predicted that the forma-
tion of state-level trade associations would decrease found-
ing heterogeneity, net of the influence of regulatory and cog-
nitive institutions (which the associations may have helped
create). Our results support this hypothesis. The coefficient
on the trade association dummy is negative, as predicted,
and statistically significant. Holding all else constant, the exis-
tence of an industry association decreased founding hetero-
geneity by 34 percent.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Much previous research has suggested that organizational
diversity is greatest when societal sectors are new and that
diversity declines as political, technical, and cultural institu-
tions develop and stabilize social interactions (e.g., DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983). In particular, research on technology and
organizations suggests that at the beginning of technology
life cycles, firms experiment with diverse technologies and
that diversity declines after a dominant design emerges
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Our study, which focused on
the pre-dominant-design phase of technological and organiza-
tional evolution, revealed a more complex pattern.
We found that the development of regulative institutions and
cognitive institutions, which we argued served to increase
the legitimacy of the new independent-power sector as a
whole, increased the founding rates of all kinds of organiza-
tions. The impact of such institutional developments was
most pronounced, however, on entrepreneurs founding firms
using risky new technologies. This is consistent with general
psychological arguments that reductions in risk, and therefore
increases in the probability of success, have bigger impacts
on behavior when initial probabilities of success are relatively
low (Thaler, 1980; Weber, Shafir, and Blais, 2004). As the
overall risk level declined, foundings of what had been rare
types of entrants increased more than foundings of what had
been common types of entrants, and founding heterogeneity
increased.
In sharp contrast, the emergence of normative institutions,
created through the activities of trade associations, served to
reduce the overall heterogeneity of foundings. As is the case
for many collective organizations, these trade associations
were dominated by organizations with “deep pockets” that
typically used brown-fuel cogeneration technologies. As a
consequence, the trade associations tended to promote
established technologies over new ones. Such selective sup-
port increased the founding rates of organizations using
established technologies more than the founding rates of
organizations using new technologies. The aggregate effect
was to reduce the variety of newly founded firms—to spur a
lot more of what were already common events (foundings of
firms using established technologies) and only a little more of
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what had been rare events (foundings of firms using new
technologies).
This paper contributes to three lines of research on organiza-
tions: ecological analysis, institutional approaches, and stud-
ies of technology and entrepreneurship. For all three lines of
research, we depart from most prior studies by analyzing
causal links between micro-level phenomena (perceptions of
risk by potential entrepreneurs and resource providers) and
macro-level outcomes (founding rates and founding hetero-
geneity). Doing so suggests non-obvious predictions about
entrepreneurial behavior in risky settings such as new sec-
tors.
We contribute to ecological analysis by examining the exter-
nal forces that affect the overall level of organizational diversi-
ty. Although many previous ecological studies have shown
how environments come to favor some forms over others
(for a review, see Carroll and Hannan, 2000), we have little
knowledge of the forces that drive overall levels of organiza-
tional diversity, especially in new sectors. Organizational
diversity plays a critical role in organizational evolution: the
types of organizations selected by the environment depend
on which types of organizations exist. Therefore, organiza-
tional diversity facilitates societal adaptation by increasing the
probability that solutions well suited to changing environmen-
tal demands will exist (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Our
study demonstrates that institutional forces can play two dif-
ferent roles, either enhancing conditions for all kinds of orga-
nizations or supporting particular forms of organization. In
particular, our analysis extends previous ecological studies by
showing that the density of organizations in a new sector
affects not only rates of founding but also the variety of orga-
nizations founded.
We contribute to institutional research by shifting the focus
from mimetic isomorphic processes, which tend to increase
organizational homogeneity (for a review, see Mizruchi and
Fein, 1999), to a more balanced view of how institutional
forces can promote both homogeneity and heterogeneity. In
doing so, we extend the few institutional analyses that have
focused on organizational heterogeneity (e.g., Clemens,
1997; Schneiberg, 2002) by investigating interactions
between institutional processes and entrepreneurial action.
We also answer Scott’s (2001: 211) call to examine all three
institutional pillars, their “interactions, conjoint effects, [and]
conflicts.” Our analysis shows that regulative, cognitive, and
normative institutions can have divergent effects on organiza-
tional heterogeneity. Finally, whereas past institutional
research has focused on the legitimacy of an organizational
form or practice (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), we distinguished
between the legitimacy of an entire sector and the legitimacy
of a particular organizational form within that sector (see also
Powell, 1991; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Deeds, Mang, and
Frandsen, 2004).
We contribute to research on technology and entrepreneur-
ship by revealing the link between technology entrepreneur-
ship and the institutional environment, which has received lit-
tle attention (Shane and Venkataraman, 2003). Our analysis
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showed that foundings in independent power became more
varied as regulative and cognitive institutions lowered barriers
to entry, in large part because lowering entry barriers reduced
risks associated with the sector, thus enabling those who
were committed to novel technologies to mobilize the
resources they needed to found their ventures. For example,
the density of firms in the sector that used established tech-
nologies increased founding rates of ventures using novel
technologies. This suggests that the early entrance into a
new sector by firms that use established technologies helps
legitimate this new sector and that the benefits of density-
dependent legitimation of a new sector spill over to help
entrepreneurs using more radical technologies. And, unlike
most economic research, in which entrepreneurs are seen as
actors who seek to maximize profit by adopting the most
efficient technology, our analysis indicates that the type of
technology chosen by entrepreneurs is shaped by their goals
and experience, as well as by access to material and social
resources. Interviews with green-technology entrepreneurs
who advocated wind power showed that they rarely built gas
cogenerators if the price of natural gas declined. Instead,
they waited until they were able to mobilize the necessary
resources to use their preferred technology.
Our study also has relevance for public-policy scholars. Our
findings clearly demonstrate that government policies can
have a significant impact not just on overall founding rates
(Russo, 2001) but on the types of organizations founded. Of
particular interest in this respect are the effects of avoided-
cost policies, which are contrary to the expectations of both
economic analysts and many industry participants. Typical
economic explanations predict that the market price of an
undifferentiated product such as electric power will not influ-
ence the choice of technology used to make the product;
instead, the most economical method of producing the com-
modity will be chosen, to maximize profit. Our research tells
a different story. Increasing sectorwide subsidies, such as
avoided-cost rates, greatly increased the probability that risk-
ier new technologies would be used and so spurred the
founding of a wider array of technological forms.
As Hirsh (1999) observed, the niche created by PURPA
served as an incubator for a host of innovative technologies
whose efficiencies increased dramatically during this period
(see also U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1985; Berg-
er, 1997). For example, the cost of wind power dropped from
an estimated $.30/kilowatt-hour in 1980 to $.05/kilowatt-hour
in 1990 (compared with an average electricity price of
$.08/kilowatt-hour in 1978). After taking into account subsi-
dies and societal costs like pollution, many analysts have
argued that wind power is competitive with power generated
by fossil fuels (Righter, 1996). Wind power has become a
worldwide growth industry, with $9 billion of new investment
in 2003 and an annual growth rate greater than 18 percent.
Similar technical advances were witnessed in other electrici-
ty-production technologies. The current success of wind and
other formerly novel technologies is a direct result of the
entrepreneurial activity in the 1980s and early 1990s (Hirsh,
1999). By creating a space in which entrepreneurs could
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experiment with and develop new technologies, PURPA
greatly increased the pace of technological innovation. The
diverse technologies developed in the wake of PURPA have
created options to manage future disruptions in fossil-fuel
supplies and serious public-health issues such as air pollu-
tion. Ironically, these technologies are currently being adopt-
ed by the very utilities that resisted their development. But
the entrepreneurs who overcame the challenges and risks of
new technologies in this new sector were the ones who
paved the way.
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APPENDIX: Technologies for Generating Electricity
The information in this section comes from the following sources: (1) the on-
line edition of the Encyclopœdia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com; (2)
Solstice, the Internet information service of the Renewable Energy Policy
Project and the Center for Renewable Energy and Sustainable Technology
(REPP-CREST), http://solstice.crest.org; (3) the Oregon Office of Energy Web
site, http://www.energy.state.or.us/renew/costs.htm; (4) the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy Web site, http://www.energy.gov/; (5) the Energy Informa-
tion Administration Web site, http://www.eia.doe.gov/; and (6) the University
of Rochester’s Department of Engineering Web site,
http://www.energy.rochester.edu/cogen/.
Green Technologies (Renewable)
Biomass/biogas. The biomass category comprises all organic materials that
are used to produce energy: wood (trees, timber waste, wood chips),
bagasse (the residue remaining after a plant has been processed, for
instance, after the juice has been removed from sugar cane), crop residues
(corn and rice hulls, peanut shells), solid waste (grass clippings, leaves), ani-
mal wastes (manure), and waste from food processing and municipal
sewage treatment plants. There are several ways to convert biomass to
energy. In direct combustion, fuel is burned with direct heat. In pyrolysis, the
biomass is thermally degraded by heat in the absence of oxygen. In this
process, biomass feedstocks, such as wood or garbage, are heated to a
temperature between 800 and 1400°F, but no oxygen is introduced to sup-
port combustion. Gasification converts biomass such as wastewater
(sewage), manure, or food processing wastes (mixed with water and fed
into a digester tank without air) to methane or hydrogen through heating or
anaerobic digestion. Fuel alcohol can be produced by converting starch to
sugar, then fermenting and distilling the sugar into alcohol. Finally, biogas
can be generated by the decay (anaerobic digestion) of buried trash and
garbage in landfills or sewage plants; when such organic waste decompos-
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es, it generates gas that is approximately 50 percent methane. Biomass
small-power plants include local sanitary landfills that produce biogas used
as fuel in internal combustion units. Cogeneration biogas units typically burn
wood waste to produce steam, this steam used primarily in manufacturing
and secondarily to run steam turbines. The cost of electricity produced from
biomass currently ranges from $.055/kilowatt-hour to $.065/kilowatt-hour.
Geothermal. Energy flows from the interior of the Earth to the surface in
steam or hot water, most often in areas of active volcanoes. There are sev-
eral methods for capturing this heat to generate electricity; typically, howev-
er, geothermal reservoirs with temperatures of 180°C or higher are used.
Steam from wells drilled to depths of hundreds of meters drives turbine gen-
erators. Geothermal generators are usually very capital-intensive, with 30 to
40 percent of costs allocated to drilling and exploration. Geothermal tech-
nologies are sophisticated and involve a high level of risk. Although the con-
cept of tapping the Earth’s heat as an energy source has been around for
decades, the technology to do this on a large scale is still fraught with uncer-
tainty. U.S. geothermal electricity generation currently totals about 2,200
megawatts, about the same as four large nuclear power plants. The cost of
developing geothermal sites varies, but current costs average $.052/kilowatt-
hour to $.065/kilowatt-hour.
Micro hydro. Hydro-electric power stations capture the energy in flowing
water to produce electricity. Small hydro-electric generating systems, which
generally have capacities up to 2 megawatt and which account for about 30
percent of the world’s hydroelectric potential, provide clean and cheap elec-
tricity for local applications. Micro hydro systems are less environmentally
destructive than large dams. The technology involved is simple: hydraulic tur-
bines change the energy of fast-flowing or falling water into mechanical
energy that drives power generators, which in turn produce electricity. The
costs of electricity produced from this source average between $.07/kilo-
watt-hour and $.11/kilowatt-hour.
Solar. Solar energy can be captured as heat in solar thermal applications or it
can be converted directly into electricity using photovoltaic cells. Solar ther-
mal technologies use the heat in sunlight to produce hot water, heat for
buildings, or electric power; applications range from simple residential hot
water systems to multi-megawatt electricity generating stations. Large gen-
erators typically use solar thermal technology. Currently, this is the cheapest
solar energy, averaging $.08/kilowatt-hour. Photovoltaic cells convert solar
radiation into electricity. Most are made of silicon, but other semiconducting
materials can be used. A conventional solar cell consists of a wafer of silicon
that is about .02 inches thick. Typical cells, 4 inches in diameter, produce
about 1 watt of power; dozens of cells are grouped into modules; modules
are further grouped into panels; finally, panels are grouped into arrays. Each
array can produce several kilowatts of power. Although the cost of electricity
produced by photovoltaic cells has decreased over the last two decades, it is
still relatively high, about $.194/kilowatt-hour to $.236/kilowatt-hour.
Wind. Wind contains tremendous amounts of energy. Wind-power systems
have four components. Wind turbines convert kinetic energy to electric
power. Blades or rotors catch the wind by changing the horizontal move-
ment of wind into a rotational force turning a shaft. A generator then con-
verts the mechanical energy of the rotating shaft into electrical energy. A
tower lifts the wind turbine (sometimes more than ten stories high) so that it
can take advantage of the stronger, more consistent winds that blow above
the ground. The capacity of wind farms varies substantially, from less than 1
megawatt to over 90 megawatts. The cost of wind power has declined sub-
stantially over the past two decades; it now averages $.045/kilowatt-hour to
$.081/kilowatt-hour.
Brown Technologies (Non-renewable)
Fuel oil. Fuel oil has been used in electricity generation for decades; it cur-
rently is used primarily with cogeneration systems. The fuels in this category
include fuel oil numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6; crude oil; petroleum coke;
kerosene; liquid butane and propane; methanol; liquid byproducts; oil waste;
sludge oil; and tar oil.
Natural gas. Natural gas has been a source of electricity since the early
1900s. It is a relatively clean-burning fuel. In the context of PURPA, this fuel
is used primarily in cogeneration systems.
Coal. Commonly used since the eighteenth century, coal still accounts for
about one-third of all power produced in the U.S. Under PURPA, qualifying
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facilities were allowed to burn coal only in cogenerators, not in small power
plants.
Waste natural gas. This is a low-grade fuel that, under PURPA, could be
burned in both cogenerators and small power plants.
Nuclear. For the most part, nuclear cogenerators are government, military,
and (occasionally) university facilities. There were only two nuclear cogenera-
tors in our sample.
Other waste. This classification includes all fuels used in small power plants
and cogenerators that are non-renewable: batteries, chemicals, hydrogen,
sulfur, purchased steam, medical waste, tires, liquid acetonitrile waste, solid
by-products of industrial processes, and pitch.
Other. This category includes diverse brown fuels, notably propane and oil
mixtures, that are occasionally used in small power plants and cogenerators
and that do not fit in any other category. In our sample, only 1.2 percent of
generators (25) fell into this category.
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